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Abstract 
Notwithstanding the significant advances made over the last twenty years in terms of charting 
and explaining the ways in which state punishment is influenced by economic and political 
forces, little is still known about the penal effects of conditions of economic crisis and about 
the role the incumbent government’s political orientation plays in this regard. Because the few 
available studies on these questions have been preoccupied with the Anglo-American sphere 
and only in the context of recent decades at that, even less is known either about the 
implications that different types or experiences of economic crisis carry for state punishment, 
or about the influence exerted in this respect by government political orientations other than 
those found in established democracies. Irrespective of geographical or temporal scope, 
moreover, the impact that different extranational factors and actors may have in terms of 
economic, political or directly penal matters domestically remains poorly understood. With a 
view to helping fill these gaps in the literature, this article explores the effects on state 
punishment that economic crisis and government political orientation had in interaction with 
one another in the context of interwar Greece. Attention is first paid to the various ways in 
which global capitalism was decisive in creating within Greece an environment conducive to 
increased punitiveness on the part of the state. The focus is on the economic, social and political 
consequences of the Wall Street crash of 1929 and Britain’s exit from the gold standard in 
1931, as these were exacerbated by Greece’s long-term exposure to predatory lending, 
speculative investing and external interference in her domestic affairs in the context of 
engaging international capital markets. The article then proceeds to discuss how the Liberal 
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, scholarship has made significant advances in charting and 
explaining the ways in which state punishment is influenced by economic and political forces. 
Most notably, we now understand a great deal more about the penal implications of different 
economic systems and political institutions (see, e.g., Lacey, 2008; Wacquant, 2009a; De 
Giorgi, 2006). Further progress in this area, however, requires avoiding analytic tendencies 
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that have to date been restrictive. Six such tendencies, interrelated with one another, stand out: 
first, what could be referred to as penological reductionism, in the sense that state punishment 
has been customarily conceptualised and operationalised solely in the form of conventional 
imprisonment (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2020, 2016; Tonry, 2007; Hamilton, 2014; Newburn, 
2020); second, what may be termed normalcy bias, inasmuch as disproportionate attention has 
typically been paid to periods of relative economic or political stability (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 
2020, 2016; Cheliotis and Sozzo, 2016); third, ahistoricism, to the extent that limited to no 
concern has usually been shown with the long-term historical trajectories of the variables at 
issue, be they the economy, politics or state punishment in itself (Lacey and Soskice, 2021; 
Reiner, 2021; Melossi and Pavarini, 2018; Gottschalk, 2006; Rock, 2005); fourth, 
occidentalism, in that the focus has been almost fixed on the Western world and, even more 
so, on Anglophone cases within it (Karstedt, 2013; Lappi-Seppälä and Tonry, 2011; Nelken, 
2009); fifth, statism, insofar as analysis has mostly been restricted to the nation-state at the risk 
of leaving any local-level variations obscure (Phelps, 2017; Lynch, 2010; Barker, 2009); and 
sixth, methodological nationalism, given that developments inside nation-states have 
commonly been investigated without consideration of the international, transnational or global 
networks of which the states in question are part (Anderson, 2018; Wacquant, 2009b; Jones 
and Newburn, 2007; Xenakis and Ivanov, 2017).  
Thus, knowledge is lacking about the effects that conditions of economic crisis have on 
state punishment, especially beyond conventional imprisonment, and what role the incumbent 
government’s political orientation plays in this connection. Because the few available studies 
on these questions have been preoccupied with the Anglo-American sphere and only in the 
context of recent decades at that, even less is known either about the consequences that 
different types or experiences of economic crisis carry for state punishment, or about the 
influence exerted in this respect by government political orientations other than those found in 
established democracies (e.g., Left-Right, Labour-Conservative, Democratic-Republican). 
Similarly, reliance on state-centric perspectives has precluded insights into whether –and if so, 
how and why– the relationship between economic crisis, government ideology and punishment 
plays out differently in different parts of a single nation. Irrespective of geographical or 
temporal scope, moreover, the impact that disparate extranational factors and actors may have 
in terms of economic, political or directly penal matters domestically is still poorly understood.  
With a view to helping fill these gaps in the literature, this article explores the effects 
on state punishment that economic crisis and government political orientation have had in 
interaction with one another in the context of Greece. Prior relevant research on the Greek case 
has been concentrated on the contemporary period and mainly on the years during which a 
coalition government led by the left-wing Syriza party was in power. The principal conclusions 
were that economic crisis can override a sitting party’s progressive ideological orientation to 
induce malign penal outcomes, and that penally adverse economic pressures are likely to stem 
at least in good part from the international realm (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2020). This article 
looks back in time, centering on the interwar era and the timeframe between 1928 and 1932 
more specifically. Concerning state punishment in itself, the analysis covers not only 
conventional imprisonment, but also violent modes of protest policing, as well as political 
imprisonment and exile. Whereas protest policing is addressed with reference primarily to 
extant scholarship, the other three forms of state punishment are probed through novel data 
derived from a range of archival sources, spanning official statistics, government reports, and 
newspaper articles. 
There are two main reasons why the period between 1928 and 1932 is suitable for 
present purposes. On one hand, it saw the Greek economy undergo a severe crisis whose main 
roots can be clearly traced abroad and to the global capitalist system in particular, both in terms 
of the exogenous shocks that either triggered or intensified the crisis and in terms of the 
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circumstances that enhanced the Greek economy’s vulnerability to them. Specifically, although 
Greece’s economy was by no means alone in suffering a range of detrimental consequences as 
a result of the worldwide economic downturn that began in the late 1920s, the repercussions 
the country endured were especially acute due to the inordinate level of her external debt, itself 
in no small measure a reflection of the exceptionally exploitative approach taken by the 
international financial market towards borrowers from the global periphery. On the other hand, 
the span between 1928 and 1932 signified an important shift in government political orientation 
in Greece. This was the first time in nearly ten years, during which the country had been ruled 
by military coups, pro-royalist conservatives, splintered liberals or cross-party coalitions, that 
a largely united Liberal Party returned to power as a single-party government–and with a strong 
majority at that. Indeed, this was also the sole occasion in the interwar era that an elected 
government in Greece served out its full four-year parliamentary term. Whilst the Liberal Party 
and its pro-royalist conservative counterparts alike opposed dictatorship insofar as they shared 
in common a commitment to constitutional rule under freely elected governments, the former 
adamantly rejected the latter’s allegiance to constitutional monarchy. But the differences 
between them ran deeper than that. Whereas the policies supported by pro-royalist 
conservatives were loosely guided by the aim of preserving tradition and promoting the vested 
interests of those most threatened by change, the Liberal Party had a comprehensive 
programme of modernisation of state, economy and society, whose parameters were set with a 
view to establishing and consolidating the hegemony of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie 
(Mavrogordatos, 1983). Crucially, part of this plan was the transformation of the Greek state 
from an entity that sought to sustain order chiefly through law enforcement, into one which 
would govern society mainly through welfare provision; that is, welfare services meant to 
mitigate social ills that were linked to extant economic arrangements (e.g., unemployment and 
poverty) and which might otherwise give rise to challenges to the economic and political status 
quo (Agriantoni, 2006). The years 1928-1932 thus allow for investigating in relatively 
sufficient length of time how a government’s welfarist outlook interacted with a grave 
economic crisis whose origins primarily lay outside Greece’s own borders to influence penal 
policy.   
Some elaboration is in order here as to whether it is apposite to classify the Liberal 
Party as having been oriented towards a welfare-based model of social regulation. It is true that 
the Liberals’ previous tenures in office had not been devoid of repressive policies. At different 
junctures back in the 1910s, for instance, laws were passed by Liberal governments to introduce 
the punishment of internal exile for political dissidents, to impose controls on the right to strike 
action, and to allow for purging uncooperative civil servants (Edgar, 1980). Such 
developments, however, had mostly occurred in the context both of military involvement 
abroad (the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the First World War between 1914 and 1918 and the 
Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922) and the height of a civil war-like conflict (the so-called 
National Schism of 1910-1922) between supporters of the Liberals’ founding leader Eleftherios 
Venizelos and those of King Constantine, itself largely linked to Greece’s participation in the 
Great War (Gallant, 2016; Clogg, 2013). Whilst –and, at least in part, because– economic 
conditions were unstable at the time, the Liberals also encouraged the unification of diverse 
pro-labour leftist groups into a political party (what was eventually named the Communist 
Party), and pioneered a bevy of welfarist measures: from the creation of a national health 
insurance system and the striking down of usury, to the passage of decrees that broke up large 
estates and distributed land to poor peasants, to the regulation of child and female labour, to 
the setting of basic standards for working conditions, to the legalisation of  trade unions and 
the outlawing of joint trade associations (i.e., management-controlled workers unions, which 
employees were obliged to join as a condition of their employment) (Agriantoni, 2006; 
Stefanidis, 2006; Gallant, 2016; Apostolakou, 1997). On the penal front itself, moreover, 
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efforts were undertaken by Liberal governments during the 1910s to promote progressive 
reforms, ranging, amongst others, from the legislation of measures meant to reduce the use of 
imprisonment (e.g., suspended sentences and parole), to the passage of laws that enhanced 
prison oversight, to the development of detailed plans for the improvement of custodial 
conditions. These and other concrete facts that are elaborated elsewhere (Cheliotis, in progress) 
suggest it is legitimate to treat the Liberal Party as having been welfarist in its political 
orientation when it was elected to government in 1928.  
This article unfolds in two stages. It first explains the ways in which global capitalism 
was decisive in creating within Greece an environment conducive to heightened state 
punitiveness. The focus in this regard is on the economic, social and political consequences of 
the Wall Street crash of 1929 and Britain’s exit from the gold standard in 1931, as these were 
exacerbated by Greece’s long-term exposure to predatory lending, speculative investing and 
external interference in her domestic affairs in the context of engaging international capital 
markets. The article then proceeds to discuss how the Liberal government of 1928-1932 sought 
to handle the situation, paying particular attention to the approach it took towards punishment. 
 
Shackled in Debt: The Economy and State Punitiveness before 1928 
The economic history of modern Greece –indeed, the history of modern Greece as a whole– is 
inextricably linked to repeated episodes of extensive borrowing from abroad. Before even 
gaining independence from the Ottoman empire in 1829, Greece began assuming heavy 
financial debts to Western lenders. In considerable part, Greece’s very success in the War of 
Independence was achieved thanks to two hefty loans which the insurgent Greeks contracted 
in the City of London in the mid-1820s so as to fund their then ongoing military operations. 
Yet, in effect, the struggle for geographical and political liberation from the Turks set Greece 
on a path of accumulating ever-growing debt to other foreign actors. This was largely because 
of the exploitative nature of international lending in itself, combined with Greece’s own 
economic peripherality, which not only led the country to foreign creditors in the first place 
but also served to raise her vulnerability to exploitation at their hands.  
New loans to Greece typically came at excessively high nominal interest rates whose 
real value was further inflated due to speculative investing in Greek government bonds on 
international financial markets, as well as with vast fees and exorbitant commission expenses 
attached to them. As a result, net proceeds were at most sufficient to service previously accrued 
debts, which, in its turn, practically meant that Greece repeatedly needed to raise new external 
loans and accept creditors’ demands for severe austerity measures if she were to stay afloat. 
Ultimately, with limited if any funds left to support economic development, the country was 
locked in a subordinate status both in terms of her ongoing and deepening financial dependence 
on foreign actors and in terms of the erosion her political sovereignty progressively suffered 
due to their meddling in her domestic affairs (Toussaint, 2019; Doxiadis, 2018; Wynne, 1951; 
Pepelasis Minoglou, 1996; Reinhart and Trebesch, 2015). 
Greece contracted further heavy loans abroad in the aftermath of the First World War. 
But these loans, albeit again extraordinarily expensive and agreed on strict conditions in terms 
of economic reforms, assumed much more of a ‘productive’ character, a development 
prompted by the arrival in the country of masses of Greek Orthodox refugees from Asia Minor 
in the early 1920s.1 In particular, two large international loans were floated in 1924 and 1928, 
 
1 The massive influx of Greek Orthodox refugees occurred towards the end of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-
1922 and in its aftermath, when the defeated Greeks and the victorious Turks agreed to a forcible exchange of 
populations in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. By 1928, around 1.2 million Christian refugees had been moved 
to Greece, amounting to one fifth of the country’s total population (Pallis, 1929). Some 350,000 Muslims had 




respectively, whose proceeds were meant largely to support the agricultural settlement of 
refugees and an array of modernisation initiatives. Success in these undertakings was deemed 
crucial to Greece’s ongoing struggle for economic recovery, attainment of which was, in its 
turn, regarded as a necessary prerequisite of the country’s political sovereignty. As the 1920s 
were drawing to a close, however, whatever economic progress had been achieved was limited 
in scope, due not least to the fact that external loan proceeds had all too often proved 
insufficient to support the projects for which they had been secured (Kontogiorgi, 2003; 
Mazower, 1992). 
The socio-political environment thus produced was acutely volatile. Different 
administrations, including but not limited to dictatorial regimes, went down the path of 
repression in dealing with growing frustration amongst the public and the working classes in 
particular. In the first half of the 1920s, for example, it was evermore common for the 
gendarmes and the police to display unrestrained brutality towards the rising numbers of 
workers who engaged in protest actions against austerity and other policies that aggravated 
their hardship. Increasingly, the use of naked force against protestors came to be accompanied 
by the imposition of government stooges at the head of major workers’ unions, thereby further 
undermining the organisational coherence and strength of the labour movement as a whole 
(Seferiades, 1998).  
This period also saw a series of laws introduced to suppress those deemed to be political 
opponents. Most notably, in 1926, the short-lived dictatorial regime of General Pangalos 
enacted the measure of ‘administrative expulsion’ (i.e., internal exile ordered not by courts, but 
rather by local ‘security committees’) for persons suspected of acts against public order and 
state security (Alivizatos, 2011). Although no data exist as to the frequency of such provisions 
being applied in practice, their very establishment cannot but have added to the repressive 
climate of the day.  
Albeit limited to irregular snapshots that also militate against ascertaining political 
ends, the available data on imprisonment suggest that its use was undergoing growth in the 
mid- to late 1920s. It should nevertheless be noted that this growth was only slight; in fact, 
imprisonment rates still stood at much lower levels than those recorded for the early and mid-
1910s. In particular, the 1927 rate of imprisonment (including convicted and remand prisoners, 
as well as debtors) was 131 per 100,000 persons of imprisonable age (i.e., aged 10 and above), 
down by over half as compared to the corresponding rate for 1913 (294) and by 67.1 percent 
as compared to that for 1915 (399).2  
It is clear, in any case, that persisting economic uncertainty at both the national and 
personal levels coincided with an intensification of state repression in the years before a largely 
united Liberal Party found itself in power under the premiership of Eleftherios Venizelos in 
1928.3 With the economic situation about to worsen even further, the immediate question is 
whether Venizelos’ government stuck to the welfarist outlook of the Liberal Party and charted 
a different penal course than its predecessors.  
 
Three more loans and three shocks: The Economy under the Liberals 
 
2 The absolute figure for 1913 is for 1 December and was derived from the annual account of the Ministry of 
Justice for that year; the absolute figure for 1915 is for 1 October and was derived from the January 1915 issue of 
the journal Politiki Epitheorisis; and the absolute figure for 1928 is for 31 December and was derived from the 
1929 report published by the National Statistical Service of Greece about imprisonment. For the purposes of 
calculating per capita rates, general population data were used from the Censuses of 1907 (to calculate the per 
capita rates for 1913 and 1915) and 1928 (to calculate the per capita rate for that same year). 
 





Venizelos assumed office in August 1928, after the Liberals achieved a landslide victory in the 
national elections. Whilst on the campaign trail, Venizelos had tried hard to woo the labouring 
masses. Although he declared his intention to curb communist activity (Stefanidis, 2006), he 
also openly expressed support for striking tobacco workers and pledged to introduce pro-labour 
policies if elected (Mazower, 1991). (Note here that Venizelos did not conflate communist 
activity with labour protest as such; a point to which I shall return later on.) Venizelos found 
willing ears amongst the working classes, albeit particularly amongst refugees 
(Mavrogordatos, 1983), who were by that point ‘sufficiently numerous and compactly settled 
to act as arbiters of political life’ (Clogg, 2013: 104).  
Once in office, Venizelos promoted various far-reaching reforms in line with his vision 
of Greece’s modernisation. A good number of these reforms were a matter of low-cost 
bureaucratic and institutional development. For instance, the council of state was established 
as the supreme administrative court, which helped consolidate the rule of law, and the 
foundations were laid for the country’s first and long-delayed nationwide Civil Code (Gallant, 
2016; Stefanidis, 2006). At least some of the most ambitious reform projects Venizelos 
pursued, however, required major funding support that was secured on the international 
markets.  
 
Thus, in the summer of 1930, for the purposes of promoting the overhaul of the 
country’s education system and the building of new schools in particular, the Venizelos 
government signed a £1 million loan (at a real interest rate of 7.1 percent) with the Swedish 
company Krueger & Toll. More famously, Venizelos agreed two larger loans in order to 
support the ongoing infrastructural development programme –including, for example, drainage 
of lakes and construction of roads and bridges–, which he had long considered essential to the 
agricultural and industrial development of the country. Although these latter loans came to be 
known as ‘Public Works Loans’, part of the first of them was also meant to help create the 
Agricultural Bank, whose primary function was to take over agricultural credit from the 
National Bank and, as such, supply low-interest loans to farmers (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993; 
Stefanidis, 2006).  
The nominal amount of the first ‘Public Works Loan’, which was issued in December 
1928 exclusively by the London-based British bank Hambros, was £4 million (around £257 
million in today’s value). The nominal amount of the second ‘Public Works Loan’, issued in 
May 1931 by an international syndicate of banks headed by Hambros, was even higher, at £4.6 
million (approximately £320 million in today’s value). As usual, the real interest rate was high 
(at 7.1 percent for both loans), which meant that the net proceeds were substantially reduced. 
Also, the state revenues assigned as securities were excessive; in the case of the first loan, for 
example, their value stood at 25 percent of the nominal value of the loan and twenty times over 
the size of its annual service (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993). 
When all is said and done, the proceeds from the ‘Public Works Loans’ proved far from 
sufficient for such a large-scale initiative to be completed. More than that, although the loans 
in question were obtained with a view to undergirding Greece’s economic development, their 
immediate effect was to add further strain on an already weak economy (Pepelasis Minoglou, 
1993; Mazower, 1991). Due largely to the level of her external borrowing, Greece’s public 
debt was on the rise, so much so that it had grown to 155 percent of GDP by 1931. Thus, the 
cost of servicing the country’s debt continued to absorb around 10 percent of GDP 
(Christodoulakis, 2013). As a proportion of public spending, Greece’s public debt service was 
uniquely high in the Balkan region and even almost stood on a par with the rates found in so-
called ‘developed’ countries (Mazower, 1991).  
As if this were not enough, Venizelos’ latest tenure in office also saw three exogenous 
shocks befall the Greek economy, whether simultaneously or in close succession to one 
another. The first shock came in the form of extreme weather conditions between 1928 and 
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1930, as a result of which agricultural production was badly hampered: the entire cereal crop 
was destroyed in many areas around Greece, particularly in the North, and severe reductions 
were caused to harvest elsewhere in the country. Against this backdrop, there was inevitably 
pressure to expand the import of cereals in order to meet domestic demand, whilst the export 
of other agricultural products –itself the main means through which the country sought to cover 
its imports, as well as to maintain the exchange rate of its currency– was undermined 
(Kontogiorgi, 2006; Petmezas, 2000; Soldatos, 1993). 
The second and yet more profound shock was felt across all sectors of the economy. It 
was, of course, the New York Stock Exchange Crash in late October 1929 and the ensuing 
depression both within the United States and around the globe. By dint of being feeble, small 
and open, the Greek economy was bound to experience particularly acute reverberations in the 
immediate future. Demand for Greece’s principal exports plummeted, as a consequence of 
which their prices also fell dramatically (Clogg, 2013; Pelt, 1998; Kritikos, 2000; 
Christodoulaki, 1999).  
These developments implied a grave hit for the country’s revenues in foreign trade at a 
time when the latter comprised over half of the total national income. The price collapse on the 
international agricultural market was especially harmful for Greek revenues in foreign trade, 
given that Greece’s export structure was mainly based on agricultural products (Pelt, 1998; 
Stefanidis, 2006). Concurrently, there was a significant drop in imports, which, in its turn, 
brought about a reduction in custom revenues, themselves a large proportion of government 
revenues as a whole (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993).  
The decline in earnings from both exports and imports combined with a downward 
trend in the revenues from shipping, the tourist trade and emigrant remittances, as well as a 
contraction in the yields from overseas investments and the suspension of the inflow of foreign 
capital, to plunge Greece into a liquidity crisis (Pelt, 1998). Greece’s budget surplus instantly 
went into a nosedive, decreasing by 64 percent as measured in drachmas within the space of a 
single financial year (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993). As a corollary of all this, the real cost of the 
country’s debt service grew by 45 percent between 1929 and 1931, making sustained 
repayment increasingly difficult (Mazower, 1991; Christodoulakis, 2013).  
The third exogenous shock occurred in September 1931, when Britain became the first 
‘core’ country to leave the gold exchange standard. The repercussions of Britain’s move were 
especially rapid and serious for those participants in the standard who had, on one hand, pegged 
their national currency to the British pound, itself no longer convertible into gold and devalued 
by 20 percent; and, on the other hand, kept low reserves in gold (Eichengreen, 1992). Greece 
was just such a case. Because the country held over a quarter of her foreign exchange reserves 
in pound sterling at the time when Britain went off gold, her reserve fell overnight below the 
statutory lower limit of 40 percent in circulation and sight deposits (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993). 
Moreover, a few months earlier, in the summer of 1931, the Bank of Greece had sold its entire 
stock of gold to the Bank of England. Adding further to Greece’s vulnerability was the 
inordinate level of the country’s external debt, whose continued servicing required a steady 
outflow of increasingly scarce reserves (Christodoulakis, 2013).  
As soon as the news broke of Britain’s exit from the gold standard, panic selling ensued 
on the Athens Stock Exchange, forcing it to close, and a run began on the foreign exchange 
holdings of the Bank of Greece, causing it to lose $3.6 million and announce restrictions on 
foreign exchange business within the space of a few days (Mazower, 1991). At first, Venizelos 
stubbornly sought to avoid retiring Greece from the gold standard, and rather tied the drachma 
to the US dollar. By January 1932, however, the country’s financial situation was anything but 
improved. At this juncture, Greece’s external debt was by far the highest amongst debtor 
countries around the world (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990),  yet her foreign exchange reserve 
had fallen below 30 percent of the monetary circulation and sight deposits, and she was 
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experiencing difficulty in securing the necessary foreign exchange to cover external debt 
obligations (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1993; Mazower, 1991; Wynne, 1951).  
Unable to obtain another major foreign loan to resolve the situation, partly because 
international lending had in the meantime been tightened as a result of the 1929 Crash, 
Venizelos was forced to take Greece off the gold standard in the spring of 1932, which 
inevitably caused the country to default on its debt payments (Wynne, 1951). Although Greece 
was certainly not the only debtor country to default during this period, her level of debt 
rendered her an exceptionally heavy defaulter by international comparison (Eichengreen and 
Portes, 1990).  
Greece’s declaration of default naturally marked the end of Venizelos’ modernisation 
programme (Mazower, 1991; Reinhart and Trebesch, 2015). But it also delivered a decisive, 
almost final blow to the Liberal Party’s prospects for re-election. In the national election held 
in the autumn of 1932, the Liberals saw a devastating drop in their share of the vote as 
compared to the election of 1928. The result was a hung parliament, which was eventually 
resolved with the formation of a government by the pro-royalist conservative People’s Party 
(Mavrogordatos, 1983). Defeat at the ballot box, however, was merely the culmination –and, 
indeed, only one expression– of public discontent with which Venizelos’ Liberals had had to 
contend whilst in office from 1928 onwards.  
 
At Boiling Point: The Economic Crisis from the Bottom Up 
Unemployment already stood at high levels in Greece before the global economic crisis hit, 
with one-third of the potential labour force being jobless in 1929 (Soldatos, 1993). At that 
juncture and for the next three years, however, unemployment went into a rapid and sharp 
further rise. In the face of drastically reduced demand (whether in terms of exports or domestic 
consumption), large numbers of farmers were pushed into joblessness, just as more and more 
small enterprises were forced to downsize or shut down entirely (Kritikos, 2000; Mazower, 
1991). Unsurprisingly, real income simultaneously underwent a steep drop–and from a very 
low base at that (Christodoulakis, 2013).  
To make matters worse, deterioration in personal finances made staying afloat 
increasingly challenging, and more often than not outright impossible. The predicament was 
widespread in the agricultural sector, with swathes of refugees and native peasants having 
accumulated debts to local banks so as to satisfy pressing living needs (Mavrogordatos, 1983; 
Seferiades, 1999). In 1930, the approximate number of farmers with a short-term debt to the 
then nascent Agricultural Bank of Greece was as high as 286,000, whilst an estimated 58,000 
farmers owed the Bank a secured debt (i.e., a debt backed by collaterals). By 1932, the overall 
total of farmers’ debts (either to the National Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the Greek state or 
private banks) amounted to a colossal 8.5 billion drachmas (Vergopoulos, 1975). The situation 
was not dissimilar in industry. As big capital had been making vast profits, many owners of 
small units had been amassing heavy debts to banks in order to make ends meet (Kritikos, 
2008).  
Against this background, starvation also began to spread amongst the lower strata in 
various parts around the country, urban and rural alike (Mazower, 1992). All this combined 
with persistently wretched housing conditions and associated epidemics –especially in urban 
areas, and even more so for refugees, due not least to limited assistance from the Greek state 
(Kritikos, 2008; Mazower, 1991)– to intensify discontent amongst the masses. Working-class 
discontent grew even deeper after Greece left the gold standard and defaulted on its external 
debt payments in 1932. This was because the protectionist policies and, especially, the import 
restrictions which the Venizelos government introduced in an effort to cut losses for the Greek 
economy inevitably contracted commerce activity. This, in its turn, caused a further rise in 
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unemployment at a time when three out of every four working-class families lived below the 
subsistence level (Stefanidis, 2006). 
As one would expect, Venizelos and his Liberals had been losing ground with the 
working-class electorate all along. Incoming results whether from by-elections or from 
municipal and communal elections repeatedly revealed a decisive swing of the working-class 
vote to the Left and the Communist Party in particular, even if primarily by way of protest. 
Crucially, refugees also began switching their support to the Communist Party, partly as the 
latter started selecting rising numbers of them as local candidates (Mavrogordatos, 1983). What 
is more, workers’ protest actions began gradually to grow in terms of their frequency, the 
number of participants and the array of sectors involved in them, as well as their assertiveness. 
Marches, rallies, strikes and riots spread –especially in cities though increasingly in the 
countryside, too–, with protestors usually demanding debt freezes, cheaper credit and lower 
taxes. By 1932, labour mobilisations had risen to a level the country had not witnessed in the 
interwar era until then (Seferiades, 1998, 1999).  
The remainder of this article looks at how Venizelos and his Liberal government sought 
to handle the situation.  
 
Behind the ‘Red Scare’: State Coercion against Labour Protest 
Upon assuming office in 1928, Venizelos endeavoured to promote welfare reform, especially, 
as mentioned earlier, on the front of education (Stefanidis, 2006). But he also accorded 
concessions to at least certain demands the working classes conveyed in their spreading 
protests, particularly for debt relief. In 1930, for example, the Venizelos government 
introduced a five-year moratorium on agricultural debts owed to private individuals 
(Kontogiorgi, 2006). Such concessions, however, were neither sufficient to mollify the socio-
economic anxieties and anger of the protesting masses (Mazower, 1992; Mavrogordatos, 
1983), nor, in any case, did they comprise the government’s main or even first response to the 
situation at hand. It was from very early on in its tenure –and before the Great Depression hit 
Greece, for that matter– that Venizelos’ government turned to intimidation and repression as 
the principal means of seeking to curb labour unrest. So early, in fact, that the tough measures 
introduced were in effect mostly anticipatory in nature, even if they practically helped 
eventually to inflame the very issues they were intended to defeat (Seferiades, 2005; 
Mavrogordatos, 1983).  
In 1928, mobilisations were sporadic, lacking in their organisation, and limited both in 
their geographical spread and in terms of the array of sectors involved in them (Seferiades, 
1998). Nevertheless, against the background of rising economic hardship, Venizelos expected 
agitation and protest to grow before too long (Kritikos, 2020). For him, this was an opportune 
moment to try to finish off worker activism (Seferiades, 1998, 2005). The immediate question 
he and his government faced in this regard was two-pronged: first, how to justify repression at 
a time when protest itself was still both relatively scarce and weak; and second, how to do so 
without appearing to target the working class in its entirety, an appearance that would risk 
serious electoral consequences for the Liberal Party. 
To this end, Venizelos doubled down on the anti-communist rhetoric he had already 
adopted during the election campaign, albeit also twisting it in such a way as to subtly broaden 
its scope of controlling influence. Although communism in Greece was actually frail at that 
juncture –the Communist Party, for example, had a very low membership and only attracted 
1.4 percent of the vote in the national election of August 1928, as a result of which it had 
secured no seats in parliament (Mavrogordatos, 1983)–, Venizelos fully embraced a discourse 
that exaggerated its spread in the country whilst at the same time portraying it as a threat not 
just to the polity but to the Greek nation itself.  
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This was because the deep roots of Greek communism purportedly lay in Moscow, 
where the Soviets were said to be engineering an international take-over. What is especially 
important for present purposes is that, in the context of that same discourse, Venizelos now 
replaced his earlier Manichean taxonomy of labour protest according to the ideological 
orientation of participants with one which divided up discontented labourers into good or bad 
citizens according to whether they participated in protest activity or not. All protest was 
henceforth tied to the ‘foreign’ danger of communist subversion, whereas acquiescence was 
accordingly hailed as a signifier of prudent patriotism. To this extent, a decisive clampdown 
on labour protest action was deemed of the utmost urgency (Apostolakou, 1997).  
Its nationalist appeal notwithstanding, the anti-communist rhetoric Venizelos endorsed 
–including, ultimately, the call for domestic repression– was itself in good part influenced by 
foreign factors and actors. Now commonly known as the ‘Red scare’, the notion that the Soviet 
Union was seeking to incite political unrest around the world so as to overthrow national 
governments and install puppet Communist regimes instead was an invention that had already 
been sweeping the United States and Western Europe since 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized 
power in Russia. The British legation in Athens had meanwhile been putting pressure on 
successive Greek governments to adopt this line and accordingly display a ‘firm attitude’ 
towards communist activity in the country (Seferiades, 2005). Such perspectives were also 
represented and, at least informally, further cultivated amongst senior police officials in the 
context of the International Criminal Police Commission –effectively the political police 
fraternity in non-Soviet Europe from the early 1920s onwards (Fijnaut, 1997)–, of which 
Greece had been an inaugural member. 
Sure enough, within a few months after its instalment in office, Venizelos’ government 
brought to parliament a bill now widely known as the Idionym (i.e., delictum sui generis, or a 
law of its own kind), which lent the state far-reaching powers to crack down on any form of 
protest. In particular, the Idionym provided heavy punishment –a minimum term of six months 
in prison and internal exile for a period between one month and two years– for anyone who 
sought ‘the implementation of ideas whose manifest purpose [was] the violent overthrow of 
the established social order’, proselytised in favour of such ideas, or caused unrest or conflict 
during a strike or a lockout. The use of the press as a means of propagating subversive beliefs 
was determined to be a ‘particularly aggravating’ factor in judging the severity of that offence. 
Invoking reasons of public security, the bill also banned ‘communist assemblies’ and 
gatherings of individuals who advocated ‘communist’ or ‘similar’ ideas, although it did not 
outlaw the Communist Party itself.  
Venizelos proclaimed that the purpose of the Idionym was specifically to suppress 
communism as this had been formulated by the Bolsheviks and the Third International in 
Moscow. It was, in fact, the anti-communist intent explicitly attached to the bill, combined 
with the fact that much of it penalised convictions, which differentiated it from extant criminal 
legislation against subversion of the polity, hence the Idionym nomenclature (Kenna, 2001). 
As its unusually vague wording indicated, however, the bill practically afforded the 
government carte blanche to target the state’s penal apparatus against any and all 
manifestations of political dissent (Gallant, 2016; Mazower, 1997; Seferiades, 2005). 
Certainly, to the extent that the Idionym sought to penalise not just affronts against the 
state in themselves, but also actions deemed potentially preparatory in this regard, it bore the 
imprint of Greece’s participation in the International Entente Against the Third International 
(Entente internationale contre la IIIe Internationale); a Geneva-based organisation with 
chapters in over twenty European countries at the time, whose remit was to co-ordinate anti-
Communist efforts internationally (Apostolakou, 1997; Ghikas, 2004). Other key dimensions 
of the Idionym, however, were modelled on laws already introduced elsewhere in Europe to 
tackle labour activism more generally, albeit often under the guise of specifically fighting 
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Communism. This was especially evident in the fact that the bill penalised not only allegedly 
subversive actions but kindred ideas as well, without at the same time banning the Communist 
Party as such. Indeed, the piece of foreign legislation that most inspired the Idionym was the 
(Anti-)Socialist Law (Sozialistengesetz) Bismarck had passed in Germany back in 1878, well 
before Communist parties became part of the political scene in Europe (Apostolakou, 1997; 
Seferiades, 2005; Ghikas, 2004). 
News about the content of the proposed bill sparked a wave of outcry on the part of 
working-class and especially leftist organisations across the country. Strong objections were 
also raised by many leading public intellectuals in Greece and beyond. Most famously, a 
telegram of protest was sent to Venizelos by the international League against Imperialism and 
Colonial Oppression, co-signed, amongst others, by Albert Einstein (Rizospastis, 26 July 
1929). The Idionym did not go entirely unopposed in parliament, either. Indeed, as the 
Communist Party had failed to elect any MPs, the bulk of criticism against the bill came from 
the left wing of the Venizelist camp itself (Apostolakou, 1997). But Venizelos was adamant in 
rebuffing critics and, thanks to votes from the vast majority of Liberal MPs as well as with 
support from the opposition, the bill was passed into law in July 1929 (Close, 1995).4  
Venizelos, however, was also convinced that the Idionym could not be implemented 
with success unless the security apparatus of the state were substantially enhanced. Three key 
steps were taken to this end. First, a two-agency system of political surveillance was put in 
place: nearly all major cities were henceforth to be covered by the Cities’ Police, which had 
their covert policing functions enhanced, whilst the gendarmerie was responsible for the rest 
of the country (Dagas, 1995; Mazower, 1997; Seferiades, 2005). Second, the process of 
criminal investigation was entrusted to the General Security Service within the Cities’ Police, 
which was from this point onwards to include specialists in counter-subversion and counter-
espionage. And third, the number of police stations around the country was increased, as were 
the numbers of both police officers and gendarmes (Close, 1986, 1995; Samatas, 2014).  
In this context, regardless of whether labour mobilisations were organised by 
communists or not, they became evermore likely to be met with violence by the coercive 
apparatus of the state. By 1931, nearly half of labour mobilisations were subjected to physical 
coercion by the police, the gendarmes or the army. Dynamic dispersals and arrests were 
particularly common, but clashes with the authorities increasingly also resulted in protestors 
getting injured and even killed (Seferiades, 1998, 2005). In a similar vein, albeit with a view 
to preventing labour protest from occurring in the first instance, there was an intensification of 
raids upon trade union buildings both by state forces and by fascist paramilitaries sanctioned 
by the Liberal government itself. In 1929 alone, according to Rizospastis, the Communist 
Party’s newspaper, no fewer than 107 attacks were carried out on trade unions (Rizospastis, 26 
March 1930). All in all, notwithstanding the growth that state surveillance of workers and their 
activities underwent at the time both in terms of capacity and operations, brute force remained 
the main means by which Venizelos’ government sought to stifle the labour movement 
(Seferiades, 1998, 2005).  
The application of the Idionym also escalated exponentially. Already by the end of 
1929, based on data reported by Rizospastis, the new law had been invoked in 554 custodial 
sentences (whose average length was around 4.5 months) and 125 convictions of exile (for an 
average period of around 2 months) (Rizospastis, 26 March 1930). By the end of 1932, based 
on data reported by the Communist-supported charity Workers’ Aid, the implementation of the 
 
4 In 1931, the Venizelos government also revived the measure of ‘administrative expulsion’ as previously 
introduced in 1926 by the dictatorial regime of General Pangalos (Alivizatos, 2011). Although this development 
is not discussed here for reasons of space, it is worth noting that data on the use specifically of administrative 




Idionym had resulted in 2,203 custodial sentences (whose average length was 10.5 months) 
and approximately 2,000 exiles (of an average duration of around 4.5 months) (Mavrikos, 
2004). 
Notwithstanding differences in terms of the precise numbers they report, analysis of 
official data published by the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) confirms the 
general picture as to the use of custodial sentences under the Idionym law over this period. In 
particular, a total of 1,533 custodial sentences were passed between 1929 and 1932 for 
violations of the Idionym. Moreover, the number of custodial sentences imposed for such 
violations underwent year-on-year increases during this timeframe, rising by a spectacular 666 
percent overall (from the low baseline of 71 to 544). Sentences were typically to be served in 
prison (only in one case was police detention ordered instead), and the custody terms set by 
courts were mostly up to a year, although longer sentences became increasingly regular with 
time. Of all those sentenced into custody for an Idionym violation between 1929 and 1932, 665 
(or 43.3 percent) received a sentence of up to three months, 339 (or 22 percent) a sentence 
between three and six months, 340 (or 22 percent) a sentence between six and twelve months, 
and 188 (or 12.2 percent) a sentence of over a year.  
Although the data available do not afford disaggregation of those sentenced into 
custody under the Idionym as such, it is nevertheless possible to glean revealing insights as to 
the scope of the Idionym’s implementation if one disaggregates those who were given custodial 
sentences for offences ‘against the security of the state’, nearly all of which consisted in 
Idionym violations (at a 94.6 percent rate overall between 1929 and 1932). To start with, 
although by far most of those sentenced into custody for offences ‘against the security of the 
state’ had not previously been convicted of an offence in criminal court, the proportion of those 
who had been so almost doubled between 1929 and 1932, rising from 10 to 19.4 percent. 
Interestingly, within the latter category, the share of those who had been convicted specifically 
of an offence ‘against the security of the state’ decreased during the period under consideration, 
which indicates an expansion in the scope of the Idionym’s application. 
Moreover, the great bulk of those sentenced into custody for offences ‘against the 
security of the state’ were either industrial workers (including artisans) or workers in 
agriculture or another unspecified sector. Together, these categories amounted to 1,197, or 
three-quarters, of all 1,610 individuals sentenced into custody for an offence ‘against the 
security of the state’ between 1929 and 1932. This was in effect proportionate to their combined 
share in the general working-age population of the country (at 73.4 percent, based on data from 
the 1928 census). Upon further disaggregation, however, it transpires that industrial workers 
were disproportionately likely to find themselves persecuted.  
In particular, although industrial workers comprised 16.5 percent of the country’s 
working-age population, they amounted to 47 percent of all persons sentenced into custody for 
an offence ‘against the security of the state’. Workers in an unspecified sector were also over-
represented but agricultural workers were under-represented. The former comprised 20 percent 
of all persons sentenced into custody for an offence ‘against the security of the state’ but 7.2 
percent of the working-age population, whereas the latter constituted 7.2 percent of all those 
sentenced into custody for an offence ‘against the security of the state’ but 49.6 percent of the 
working-age population (see also Ghikas, 2004). The most likely explanation of these trends 
is that, by contrast with their counterparts in agriculture, workers in the industry and other 
sectors tended by dint of their professional status to be concentrated in urban areas, which is 
precisely where the coercive apparatus of the state had been most active in expanding and 
intensifying both its overt and covert operations against the labour movement.  
Corroborating this claim is the fact that the overwhelming majority of offences ‘against 
the security of the state’ had been recorded either in large cities as such or, at least, in broader 
areas that included metropolitan centres. In particular, most offences had been recorded in the 
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region of Athens and Boeotia (which alone accounted for 44.5 percent of all such offences 
between 1929 and 1932) or in Thessaloniki, Larissa, Lesvos or Kavala. But what is also 
important to note here is, as Ghikas (2004) notes, that whilst these locales had large 
concentrations of workers, they did not necessarily display higher-than-average support for the 
Communist Party at the time. This further bolsters the argument that the Idionym was used to 
target workers as a whole, rather than just those amongst them who were (or were thought to 
be) communists. 
 
Finally, although almost all of those sentenced into custody for an offence ‘against the 
security of the state’ were Orthodox Christians and had Greek citizenship, a significant portion 
of them –417, or 25.9 percent, out of a total of 1,610 between 1929 and 1932– had been born 
in Turkey. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that around one in four workers targeted through 
the Idionym was a refugee from Asia Minor, a rate of representation which was 
disproportionately high relative to the estimated 17.7 percent share of such refugees in the 
general population of the country at the time. The reason why refugees found themselves 
disproportionately targeted is likely to have been, at least in part, their increasing involvement 
in tobacco workers’ unions, themselves the most compact, organised and militant segment of 
Greece’s working class during the period at issue (Mavrogordatos, 1983). 
 
Scaring Everyone Straight: The Broader Prison Boom  
Further analysis of official NSSG data reveals that, alongside the intensified imposition of 
custodial punishment for political dissidence, there was also a stark ascent in the use of 
imprisonment for other, apparently non-political reasons.  
Between 1928 and 1932, and following notable year-on-year increases, the overall size 
of the country’s prisoner population (including convicted and remand prisoners, as well as 
debtors) underwent a 39.2 percent rise as measured in end-of-year snapshots, from 6,942 to 
9,666. Expressed as a per capita rate, 202 in every 100,000 persons of imprisonable age were 
in prison at the end of 1932, up by over a third as compared to the 1928 rate.5  
 Prisoner caseload data paint a similar picture.6 Between 1929 and 1932, the total annual 
caseload of prisoners rose by a stark 51.6 percent overall (from 46,196 to 70,051). This was 
because of a rise both in the caseload of convicted prisoners (by 46.2 percent, from 25,855 to 
37,809) and, even more so, in the caseload of debtors (by 117.7 percent, from 10,845 to 
23,619), whilst the caseload of remand prisoners underwent an overall drop (by 9.1 percent, 
from 9,496 to 8,623).  
Indeed, by 1932, both the total caseload of prisoners and the respective caseloads of 
convicted prisoners and debtors had grown to be by far the highest in Greece’s penal history 
up to that point (and ever since, for that matter). Expressed as a rate per 100,000 persons of 
imprisonable age, a staggering 1,461 imprisonments (whether under conviction, on remand, or 
for debt) occurred in 1932. The per capita rate specifically for imprisonment under conviction 
was 788 per 100,000 persons of imprisonable age, whilst the rates for imprisonment for debt 
and remand imprisonment were 493 and 180, respectively. 
Due to reasons of space, the remainder of this section will focus on imprisonment under 
conviction. Between 1929 and 1932, there was a 45.8 percent rise in the number of convicted 
prisoners admitted to prison (from 21,122 to 30,803), all of which was effectively the outcome 
of a 46.9 percent rise in the number of new admissions under sentences of up to five years 
 
5 For the purposes of calculating per capita rates, general population data were derived from the Greek state’s 
official statistical annual report (Statistiki Epetiris) for 1930. 
 
6 The term ‘caseload’ refers to the total number of cases of individuals held in custody during a given year (see 




(from 20,579 to 30,064). Throughout this period, the working classes consistently formed the 
overwhelming majority of convicted prisoners, with the proportion of workers in an 
unspecified sector being close to double their respective proportion amongst the country’s 
working-age population. 
Sentencing data show that the growth in the caseload of convicted prisoners was 
because of an upsurge specifically in the number of those sentenced to serve a custodial term 
up to a year, which, based on NSSG’s own measurements, increased from 830 to 1,130 per 
100,000 population between 1929 and 1932 (when the per capita rate of those sentenced to 
serve a sentence between one and five years remained effectively stagnant). But what explains 
the rise in the use of custodial sentences up to a year in themselves? 
The number of those receiving such sentences underwent a significant rise in relation 
to a variety of offence categories beyond the Idionym, including, for example, ‘honour’ crimes, 
self-redress and unjustifiable acts of violence, and theft. In the absence of systematic data on 
the prevalence of crime as such, however, it is hard to ascertain the degree to which sentencing 
trends reflected developments in terms of criminal activity. A close look at annual-level data 
on the operations of the country’s courts nevertheless suggests that the explanation is to be 
found in reforms to the workings of the criminal justice system and the politico-economic 
considerations that underpinned them.  
Specifically, the data point to the role of one-membered misdemeanour tribunals; 
namely, tribunals where cases were heard by a single judge only. The Venizelos government 
legislated their establishment in February 1929 with the immediate aim of expediting the 
processing of a wide array of cases that would otherwise have to be dealt with by the extant 
(three-membered) misdemeanour courts. What is especially important for present purposes is 
that the jurisdiction of the new tribunals included various offences punishable with short 
custodial sentences: at first, offences that carried a sentence of up to six months, but as of 1931, 
also offences that carried a sentence of up to a year.  
The total number of one-membered misdemeanour tribunals around the country 
underwent a rapid rise, reaching 221 by 1931 already, when the other (i.e., three-membered) 
misdemeanour courts just amounted to 50. Their caseload, moreover, was heavy from the very 
beginning, but it also grew dramatically within the space of merely four years. For example, 
the annual volume of cases received for processing rose by an astounding 228 percent between 
1929 and 1932 (from 38,274 to 125,567). No doubt this was in good part because of the wide 
and, as of 1931, further expanded scope of cases over which jurisdiction was formally 
transferred to one-membered tribunals. The exponential rise in both the capacity and on-the-
ground operations of the police at the time is bound to have made an additional contribution to 
the number of cases that reached the new tribunals.    
One-membered tribunals proved particularly efficient by the then prevalent standards, 
reaching decisions on a vast number of cases annually, most of which within a few months. In 
1932, for instance, one-membered tribunals issued decisions on 134,588 cases and in relation 
to 113,233 defendants, figures that far exceeded the combined totals recorded for 
Misdemeanours Courts, Assize Courts, and Appeals Courts. Although proceedings in one-
membered tribunals did not inevitably result in a conviction –roughly six out of every ten 
defendants would, in fact, be found innocent of the charges levied against them, a rate which 
may be taken to indicate the increasingly unrestrained and overzealous approach the police 
adopted at the time–, they would still see vast and rising numbers of people sentenced every 
year to serve a term in custody (most often in prison, or otherwise in a police station). For 
example, one-membered tribunals meted out prison sentences for a total of 34,363 persons in 
1932 alone, up by 45.7 percent as compared to the 23,580 people they sentenced to 
imprisonment two years earlier, in 1930. The great preponderance of those (95.7 percent of the 
total) were sentenced to a prison term of up to a month, although the absolute numbers of those 
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sentenced to longer prison terms were not insignificant as such (e.g., in 1932, 1,406 persons 
were sentenced to imprisonment for a period between one and six months). 
To be sure, high numbers of people were sentenced to short-term imprisonment by other 
courts as well. Most notably, in 1932, three-membered Misdemeanours Courts sentenced 
21,465 persons to prison terms up to a year, whilst another 23,281 were sentenced to similar 
terms by Magistrates’ Courts. But these figures represented a significant drop compared to the 
levels recorded for 1930 (down from 26,547 and 32,651, respectively), and were also way 
lower than the figures recorded for one-membered misdemeanour tribunals.7 Within four years, 
in other words, the newly established tribunals grew to be by far the most active judicial actor 
in terms of the numbers of people upon whom they imposed short-term custodial sentences.  
Ultimately, as elaborated in detail elsewhere, the institution of one-membered 
misdemeanour tribunals was part of the Venizelos government’s effort to strengthen the hold 
of the state over the working classes and the most deprived amongst them in particular. That is 
to say, in promoting the expanded imposition of short-term imprisonment for relatively minor 
criminal offences, the tribunals were intended to enhance a fear-based type of acceptance of 
state power amongst the poor as a whole, at the same time as forcing many of them to undergo 
direct disciplining in prison itself. Although the experience of imprisonment was generally 
meant to compel subjects to adopt an attitude of docile resignation to state authority, rising 
numbers of convicts were also placed onto work programmes –including, ironically, prison-
building projects– that advanced a similarly submissive stance towards labour exploitation (see 
further Cheliotis, in progress).  
There was, it should be added, another aspect to the tribunals (and the broader court 
system within which they quickly emerged as a key component). In particular, the tribunals 
were structured and operated in such a way as to simultaneously push for the intensified use of 
conversion of the short custodial sentences they passed into stiff monetary penalties or fines. 
Thus, even whilst inflating prison populations, and not unlike imprisonment specifically for 
debtors, the tribunals were also meant to extract from the most disadvantaged fractions of the 
population financial resources that could help fill holes in the state budget under conditions of 
economic crisis (ibid.).  
 
Conclusion 
This article addresses a crucial topic that has curiously received limited consideration to date: 
how conditions of economic crisis and the political orientation of government interact to 
influence state punishment. In so doing, the article breaks with the bulk of prior pertinent 
scholarship –and, indeed, with the majority of works in the broader field of the political 
economy of punishment– in a number of ways. In addition to focusing on Greece, a little-
studied case from the global periphery, the article takes a historical perspective and situates the 
analysis in the interwar years and the Great Depression in particular, itself a critical but equally 
under-studied juncture. Whether with reference to Greece’s economy, politics or state 
punishment, moreover, heed is paid to international influences and, to the extent that the 
available data and space allow, instances of local variation. Finally, for the purposes of charting 
state punishment as such, use is made not just of the standard indicator of conventional 
imprisonment, but also of trends in political imprisonment and exile, as well as in violent 
policing of protest.  
 It is first shown that, as in years past, so too in the interwar era, the size of the external 
loans Greece contracted and the exploitative conditions international lenders attached to them 
posed a most severe hindrance to the country’s economic recovery. Worse still, high and 
 
7 That the number of people sentenced to imprisonment by courts was notably higher than the number of convicted 




growing indebtedness also increased Greece’s sensitivity to exogenous shocks. This sensitivity 
came into sharp relief towards the end of the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s, when 
three such shocks occurred either simultaneously or in close proximity to one another: first, the 
repeated emergence of extreme weather conditions between 1928 and 1930, as a consequence 
of which Greece’s agricultural production was badly diminished; second, the Wall Street crash 
of 1929, which caused the collapse of global commodity markets; and third, Britain’s exit from 
the gold standard, which essentially intensified the effects of the 1929 crash. Each of these 
three shocks would have alone sufficed to cause harsh reverberations to the debt-ridden Greek 
economy. Cumulatively, their effect was bound to be tragic. Due, ironically, to the fact that 
Venizelos failed to secure yet another loan from abroad, Greece defaulted on her external debt 
in 1932.  
Αs the article proceeds to demonstrate, the country’s economic predicament translated 
into a range of devastating consequences for large segments of the population and the working 
classes in particular. Unemployment rose rapidly and real income fell precipitously at a time 
when many, especially farmers, had already accumulated deep debts to private lenders or the 
state so as to make ends meet. The consequent spread of starvation combined with stubbornly 
dismal housing conditions to exacerbate discontent amongst the masses, thereby increasing the 
appeal of resort to radicalism. Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, workers’ protest actions had 
clearly become more frequent, more populous, and more assertive.  
Partly in an effort to anticipate labour unrest, and partly in reaction to its rise, the 
Venizelos government deployed the pretext of fighting the ‘foreign’ danger of Communist 
subversion to promote legislative and institutional reforms –most notably, the Idionym law and 
the reorganisation and expansion of the security apparatus of the state– that allowed for the 
intensified use of intimidatory and repressive measures against mobilised workers, whether in 
terms of protest policing or in terms of political imprisonment and exile. Belligerent action 
against the labour movement was at its most pronounced in large cities, which also helps to 
explain the disproportionate representation of industrial workers amongst the targeted 
population. 
Facilitated greatly by the introduction of one-membered misdemeanour tribunals, a 
steep rise also manifested itself in the volume of people serving short-term prison sentences 
for relatively minor criminal offences. Notwithstanding the crime control mission that was 
formally ascribed to it, such punishment was expanded by Venizelos’ government in an effort 
to further tighten the grip of the state over the impoverished working classes in the sense of 
cowing them into submission to the established politico-economic order. At the same time –
and here, too, the newly created tribunals were crucial–, there was a push also to accelerate the 
use of conversion of short prison sentences into hefty monetary penalties or fines so as to raise 
proceeds that would then help to reduce state budget gaps.  
All things considered, Venizelos’ Liberal government did not only deviate from the 
Liberal Party’s own vision of maintaining socio-political order through welfarist interventions, 
it also effectively reproduced and, in fact, redoubled the authoritarianism of earlier 
administrations, including dictatorial regimes. In so doing, moreover, it paved the way to even 
more repressive criminal justice and cognate policies that were adopted in subsequent years, 
most notably by the dictatorship of General Metaxas from 1936 onwards, and whose targets 
ended up including supporters of Venizelos and the Liberal Party themselves (Samatas, 2014; 
Seferiades, 2005; Mazower, 1991; Close, 1986).  
This article therefore lends broad support to two main findings from previous research 
on the relationship between economic crisis, the ideological orientation of government and 
state punitiveness in the context of contemporary Greece: first, that economic crisis can 
outweigh the welfarist outlook of an incumbent party to prompt malign penal effects; and 
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second, that the origins of penally adverse economic pressures are likely to lie at least in good 
part in the international sphere (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2020).  
In the case of interwar Greece, the economic crisis the country faced from the late 1920s 
onwards, largely as a result of the Wall Street crash and Britain’s departure from the gold 
standard, triggered or otherwise inflamed social disorder and concomitant political turmoil 
whilst concurrently hindering or altogether disallowing state responses other than repressive 
measures. Although administrations of an explicitly conservative political orientation would 
have likely resorted to repression anyway, the reigning Liberal Party’s welfarist outlook was 
trumped by the crisis. Repression was further facilitated by foreign actors who furnished the 
Venizelos government with the ideological veil of anti-communism, legislative inspiration in 
the drafting of the Idionym law, and direct encouragement to crack down on labour activism. 
Arguably, however, the government’s heightened susceptibility to such influences was itself 
linked to the unfolding crisis on the domestic economic front.  
Granted, the Venizelos government sought to set the stage for, and to some degree also 
actively began, intensifying its use of state repression before the economy fell to crisis levels 
and whilst related social turbulence was not yet politically parlous as such. But this should not 
obscure the poor and worsening condition in which the Greek economy already was when the 
Liberals took office in 1928, whence also their expectation that labour protest would soon 
grow. Nor should one miss the fact that repression increased further and, indeed, reached its 
apogee as the economic situations developed into a full-blown crisis and labour protest did 
spread from 1929 onwards.  
The degree to which this article’s conclusions hold beyond Greece is an open question. 
There appears to be broad correspondence with at least some prior studies of the specific 
relationship between deteriorating economic conditions and state punishment in the form of 
conventional imprisonment. To give a flavour of this, Hall et al.’s (1978) examination of 
Britain during the 1970s and Iturralde’s (2008) work on Colombia from the 1980s onwards 
corroborate that grave economic instability coincides with an intensification in the use of 
imprisonment against common crime. Pertinent literature, however, is not without 
counterpoints. With regard to the United States since the 2008 financial crisis, for instance, 
Aviram (2015) reports a positive link between economic downturn and official efforts to reduce 
resort to imprisonment, especially in connection with minor offences (see further Cheliotis and 
Xenakis, 2020). One way or another, the comparability of previously studied instances of 
critical decline in economic activity is a matter yet to attract sustained attention in relevant 
penological scholarship.  
Similarly, little clarity can be gained from the limited evidence that exists on the impact 
of the Great Depression itself on imprisonment in countries other than Greece. Whereas, for 
example, Michalowski and Carlson (1999) find that the Depression only had a weak positive 
effect on imprisonment rates in the United States (see also Jankovic, 1977), Box (1987) reports 
a null effect in England and Wales, whilst Laffargue and Godefroy (1989) detect a definitive 
positive effect in France, as does Greenberg (1980) for Poland. It is possible that such variation 
might be explained, at least partly, with reference to cross-national differences in how the 
Depression manifested itself macro-economically or how it was experienced at ground level 
by lay citizens. Once again, however, these are issues that have yet to be addressed. 
Things are no less unclear once conceptualisation of state punishment is extended 
beyond conventional imprisonment to encompass other state operations as well. This article’s 
observation that both conventional and political imprisonment underwent growth in Greece 
when the Great Depression struck represents a departure from Melossi’s (2008) thesis that 
these two forms of carceral punishment tend to rise at discrete moments of a nation’s economic 
life (the former when there is a downturn and the latter when there is prosperity). In any case, 
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and notwithstanding the treatment usually accorded to it thus far, the scope of state punishment 
is much wider than its carceral manifestations.  
Ultimately, the generalisability of this article’s findings –including about the functions 
of penal repression, the mechanisms that translate economic pressures into penal effects, the 
impact of government political orientation, and the role of international forces intervening in 
the economic, political or penal realm of a nation-state– can only be ascertained through 
systematic comparative study of different forms of state punishment across diverse national 
contexts and various types and experiences of economic crisis. 
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